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Abstract 
 
The Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that a California law 
declaring class arbitration waivers unconscionable was preempted because it stood as an 
“obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the Federal 
Arbitration Act.  The Court’s Concepcion decision was necessarily based on implied preemption, 
because the FAA contains no express preemption clause and because there was no textual conflict 
between the FAA and the California law.  Concepcion illustrates two fundamental problems with 
implied preemption: it violates federalism principles by permitting significant federal 
encroachment on state laws, and it violates separation-of-powers principles by permitting the 
Court to re-write federal statutes in accordance with the Court’s inferred (and arguable) 
interpretation of statutory purpose.  This article argues that the Court’s preemption analysis of the 
FAA is wrong and that the FAA should preempt only textually inconsistent state laws. 
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The Supreme Court’s recent 5-4 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion1 
controversially held a California law that declared class arbitration waivers unconscionable was 
preempted because it stood as an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives”2 of § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).3  In doing so, the majority 
engaged in a contentious debate with the dissenters over whether California’s Discover Bank4 
rule was consistent with the FAA’s primary objective and to what extent the FAA’s savings 
clause in § 2 precluded California’s general policy against exculpatory contracts.  Crucially, 
however, the two sides disagreed over the FAA’s primary purpose and whether the nature of class 
arbitration proceedings was fundamentally at odds with the appropriate definition of arbitration.   
This disagreement and others like it involving doctrines of implied preemption can be 
avoided by applying Professor Stephen Gardbaum’s new perspective on federal preemption.5  
Gardbaum argues that a fundamental misconception of preemption, that Congress’s power to 
preempt flows from the Supremacy Clause, confuses the issue of whether concurrent state 
authority has actually been displaced.6 A proper understanding of the FAA’s effect on state 
contract disputes therefore begins with framing Congress’s power to preempt.7  This article 
asserts that the modern dialectic over the FAA’s preemption power overly focuses on the 
purposes and objectives of Congress in passing the Act, rather than the true issue of whether there 
is actual conflict between state law and the FAA’s text.  Adoption and incorporation of 
Gardbaum’s preemption analysis provides a necessary guide to navigating the tricky waters left in 
the wake of Concepcion. 
A conversation regarding the nature of preemption and whether the FAA has preemptive 
power is essential, as Concepcion demonstrates, because the Court has shown itself willing to 
supersede state laws reflecting state public policy when those laws conflict with an inferred 
purpose of the FAA , rather than with the actual text of the Act.8  Part I of this article provides an 
accounting of the Concepcion case itself.  It methodically considers the three opinions in the case 
and the main arguments advanced by each.  In Part II, the current doctrine of implied preemption 
is analyzed and compared with the preemption theories of two legal commentators on the issue. 
This section particularly focuses on the problems associated with the “categorical” approach to 
preemption and the idea that the Court may infer the purpose of Congress to displace state 
authority.  Part III briefly examines several of the recent criticisms of Concepcion and the 
suggested unavoidable consequences of the majority’s holding.  Throughout the article we will 
demonstrate that the entrenched thinking on FAA preemption of state law exists largely because 
of misinterpretations of Congress’s preemption power and has resulted in harsh results for state 
governments as well as for unsophisticated parties to arbitration agreements.  
                                                     
1 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).   
2 Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
3 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  This section is commonly referred to as the FAA’s “savings clause,” which provides the 
criteria for which arbitration agreements are not enforceable under the FAA. 
4 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
5 See Stephen Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39 (2006); Stephen A. 
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994). 
6 Stephen Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 41 (2006) (“Thus, although 
both supremacy and preemption displace (or supersede) state law, they operate to displace different types of state law 
and do so by the different mechanisms of automatic consequence and discretionary power respectively.”). 
7 See id. at 40. 
8 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
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I.  CONCEPCION  
A. Background & Facts 
Vincent and Liza Concepcion’s case started with an increasingly typical consumer 
transaction.  Responding to Cingular Wireless’9 advertisement offering a free cellular phone with 
every new wireless contract, the Concepcions signed a two-year Wireless Service Agreement 
(WSA) in February 2002.10  The WSA contained both a clause requiring that all disputes arising 
out of the agreement be submitted to arbitration, and a class action waiver that barred the 
aggregation of similar claims.11   After signing the contracts and receiving two new phones, the 
Concepcions also received a bill for $30.22, a charge for sales tax on the phones.12  Instead of 
following the WSA’s procedure for claim dispute resolution, involving arbitration, the 
Concepcions sued AT&T Mobility in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
California in March 2006.13  The Concepcions alleged that AT&T had defrauded them as 
consumers and had falsely advertised the phones as “free.”14  The district court consolidated the 
Concepcions’ claim in September 2006 with the Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC class action 
involving the same types of advertisements and charges.15 
In December 2006, AT&T modified the arbitration clause of the WSA to include a 
“premium payment clause,” which required AT&T to pay $7,500 to a claimant if an arbitrator 
awarded the consumer an amount greater than AT&T’s largest settlement offer at the time of 
arbitrator selection.16  After the addition of this clause, AT&T filed its motion to compel 
arbitration under the WSA’s revised terms.17  The district court denied AT&T’s motion and, 
applying the California Supreme Court’s holding in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,18 held that 
“California’s stated policy of favoring class litigation and arbitration to deter alleged fraudulent 
conduct in cases involving large numbers of consumers with small amounts of damages, compels 
the Court to invalidate [AT&T]'s class waiver provision.”19   
California’s Discover Bank test requires satisfying three prongs to determine the 
unconscionability of a class action waiver in a consumer contract:  
                                                     
9 Although the Concepcions bought the contract from Cingular in 2002, the company was bought by AT&T in 
2005 and renamed AT&T Mobility in 2007.  Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 n.1 (2009).   
10 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
11 Laster, 584 F.3d at 852.   
12 Id. 
13 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
14 Id. 
15 Laster, 584 F.3d at 853. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1100. 
19 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 
2008). 
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(1) is the agreement a contract of adhesion; (2) are disputes 
between the contracting parties likely to involve small amounts 
of damages; and (3) is it alleged that the party with superior 
bargaining power has carried out a scheme deliberately to cheat 
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of 
money.20 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s application of California law and also found 
that the FAA did not expressly or impliedly preempt the Discover Bank rule.21  According to the 
Ninth Circuit, the FAA did not expressly preempt California law because the Discover Bank rule 
applied equally to any contract clause that barred class aggregation of claims.22  Therefore it did 
not conflict with the FAA’s § 2 which states that arbitration clauses “shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”23  Additionally, the FAA did not impliedly preempt Discover Bank under a theory of 
obstacle preemption because California’s law “placed arbitration agreements on the exact same 
footing as contracts that bar class litigation outside the context of arbitration.”24 
B. The Scalia Majority Opinion 
Justice Scalia wrote for the Court.  He began his analysis by discussing the purposes and 
general policy of the FAA, foreshadowing a finding of implied preemption,25 specifically the 
variety referred to as obstacle preemption.26  The majority determined that California’s policy of 
protecting consumers by barring class waivers from arbitration agreements obstructed Congress’s 
purpose in enacting the FAA and was therefore preempted.27  Scalia’s argument for FAA 
preemption rested on two main points: (1) that California’s “policy against exculpation” was not a 
ground under the FAA’s § 2, that “exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract,”28 and (2) that Discover Bank was inconsistent with the FAA’s “’principal purpose’ to 
ensure that private agreements are enforced according to their terms.”29 
In holding that the Discover Bank rule was not “a ground that ‘exist[s] at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract’ under FAA § 2,”30 Scalia engaged in a categorical evaluation 
of whether a state policy against class waivers satisfied the textual requirements of the FAA’s 
savings clause.31  In the majority’s view, California’s policy of protecting consumers from class 
waivers in adhesion contracts had a “disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements,”32 and 
                                                     
20 Laster, 584 F.3d at 854. 
21 Id. at 857-59. 
22 Id. at 857. 
23 Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
24 Id. (emphasis in original). 
25 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. 
26 Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 62.   
27 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
28 Id. at 1746. 
29 Id. at 1748 (citing Volt Info. Scis. Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 489 
(1989)). 
30 Id. at 1746. 
31 Id. at 1747. 
32 Id. 
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was therefore inconsistent with the Court’s previous holding in Perry v. Thomas.33  In Perry, the 
Court had held that states cannot “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis 
for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court 
to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.”34  In other words, because the state policy in 
Discover Bank applied only to consumer adhesion contracts, it did not apply “generally” to 
contracts and in fact would disproportionately affect agreements where the parties had agreed to 
settle their disputes through arbitration.35  Scalia also cited two law review articles in stating that 
“California courts have been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconscionable than other 
contracts.”36   
The majority’s second conclusion, that Discover Bank is hostile to the “primary purpose” 
of the FAA, exhibited a more functional analysis of what arbitration under the FAA was supposed 
to look like.37  In painting a picture of the kind of arbitration favored by the FAA, the majority 
described arbitration as: “efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute,” 
relatively informal, generally successful at “reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute 
resolution,” and beneficial because “the costliness and delays of litigation . . . can be largely 
eliminated . . ..”38  This was crucially important because the Concepcion plaintiffs argued that 
aggregation of arbitration claims, though inconsistent with the class waiver provision in the 
arbitration agreement, were not inconsistent with the purpose of promoting arbitration.  Given 
this position, the majority opinion held that class arbitration proceedings were too dissimilar to 
the kind of arbitration contemplated by the FAA to be consistent with its “primary purpose.”39 
The majority determined that “class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank 
rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”40  This rationale takes issue with the form 
of arbitration sought by the plaintiffs and its fundamental inconsistency with traditional bilateral 
arbitration. 
In our view, the second conclusion is more critical to the majority’s opinion than the first 
because it strikes at the heart of obstacle preemption: frustration of purpose.  The majority 
                                                     
33 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).  
34 Id. at 493 n.9. 
35 This inference supposes that the majority of consumer contracts include a mandatory arbitration clause for 
handling all disputes under the contract.  Because nearly all consumer contracts are now contracts of adhesion, the 
effect of the rule then applies primarily to consumer contracts.  The majority particularly found troubling the fact that 
the Discover Bank test’s requirements that damages be predictably small and a scheme to cheat consumers be alleged.  
In its view, the majority considered these factors “toothless and malleable” and contrary to the FAA’s purpose in 
favoring arbitration by only requiring mere allegation to invalidate an arbitration agreement.  See Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1750. 
36 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 39, 54, 66 (2006); and Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186-87 (2004)). 
37 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748-53. 
38 Id. at 1749 (citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
39 Id. at 1750. 
40 Id. at 1751; see also id. at 1750 ( “[T]he ‘changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-
action arbitration’ are ‘fundamental.’”) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 
(2010)); and Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (“Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional 
and different procedures and involving higher stakes.  Confidentiality becomes more difficult.  And . . . arbitrators are 
not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent 
parties.”). 
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concludes that class arbitration procedures cannot be as efficient as the bilateral procedures 
contemplated by the FAA.41  In his view, Justice Scalia considered class arbitration incapable of 
producing “efficient, streamlined” results for parties agreeing to arbitrate their disputes.42  The 
majority states, contrary to the dissent’s view, that the primary purpose of the FAA is the 
“expeditious resolution of claims” through an informal, low-cost proceeding.43  Additionally, 
arbitrators by and large are simply incapable of understanding the “often-dominant” procedural 
demands of class certification.44  As will be discussed later, these arguments for arbitration in 
Concepcion are eerily similar to the types of arguments initially launched against arbitration 
when the FAA was enacted.  Yet, the majority finds that the essence of arbitration in the FAA is 
incompatible with the modern procedural form of class actions, which is “slower, more costly, 
and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”45 
The Court’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.46 is vital in this 
respect because it determined that the class form of arbitration is so incompatible with the 
fundamental purpose of arbitration that where arbitration agreements are silent as to the 
availability of class procedure for dispute resolution, it cannot be found impliedly available.47  
Stolt-Nielsen makes the logic of the Concepcion majority clear: if class arbitration is not 
impliedly available absent a class waiver, then finding an arbitration agreement’s class waiver 
unconscionable and void under state law cannot make claim aggregation any more available than 
where the waiver was absent.  The Concepcion plaintiffs, however, raised the obvious argument 
that because parties to an arbitration agreement could provide for the possibility of aggregated 
claims in their agreement, class arbitration cannot be incompatible with the purpose of FAA 
arbitration.48  Yet Scalia, in stating that “[a]rbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA 
requires courts to honor parties’ expectations,”49 dismisses this argument because presumably 
parties cannot reasonably expect the availability of class arbitration where the contract does not 
so provide.50 
The majority opinion closes by addressing the functional effect issues raised by the 
Concepcion plaintiffs, specifically that companies that include class waiver provisions in their 
arbitration agreements will effectively immunize themselves from fraud claims.51 Citing the 
Ninth Circuit’s findings, the majority stated that the “Concepcions were better off under their 
arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would have been as participants in a class action” 
because of the premium payment clause in the revised contract.52  Therefore, because submitting 
disputes to arbitration under the agreement would result in the vastly improved position of the 
consumer, it was immaterial whether most aggrieved consumers would consider the claim too 
                                                     
41 Id. at 1750-51. 
42 Id. at 1749-51. 
43 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749. 
44 Id. at 1750. 
45 Id. at 1751.  “Indeed, class arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA in 1925; 
as the California Supreme Court admitted in Discover Bank, class arbitration is a ‘relatively recent development.’”  Id. 
(quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)). 
46 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
47 Id. at 1775. 
48 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752. 
49 Id. (citing Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010)). 
50 See id. 
51 Id. at 1753. 
52 Id. (quoting Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *12). 
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insignificant to contest or too burdensome.  In other words, despite the Ninth Circuit’s 
consideration that California had a valid (and non-preempted) interest in deterring consumer 
fraud through the class waiver ban, the majority found the interest insufficient to meet the FAA § 
2 standard of “a ground that ‘exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’”53 
C. The Thomas Concurrence 
Justice Thomas reiterated his traditional opposition to the Court’s use of the implied 
preemption doctrine, but concurred with the majority because he believed Discover Bank did not 
provide a “ground for the revocation of any contract” as textually required by FAA § 2.54  His 
concurrence analyzed the textual requirements of the FAA and the ability of the Discover Bank 
rule to provide a reason compatible with the FAA for the class waiver ban.  Because the text of § 
2 refers to “grounds . . . for revocation,” it necessarily meant that only those grounds related to 
the making of the contract were sufficient to activate the savings provision of the FAA.55   
The Discover Bank rule provides for the nonenforcement of an arbitration clause, rather 
than the revocation of the contract as required by FAA § 2.56  In Thomas’ view, the California 
rule, therefore, did not satisfy the savings clause provision of the FAA and was invalid.57  To 
Thomas, the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of AT&T’s arbitration clause as “exculpatory” was 
fatal because “[e]xculpatory contracts are a paradigmatic example of contracts that will not be 
enforced because of public policy . . . Refusal to enforce a contract for public policy reasons does 
not concern whether the contract was properly made.”58  Therefore, because the nonenforcement 
of the class waiver did not need to consider whether the contract was properly formed, it was not 
a ground sufficient for the savings clause and was preempted.59 
D. The Breyer Dissent 
The Concepcion dissent was written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan.60  Breyer followed the organization of the majority opinion and argued 
that: (1) the Discover Bank rule satisfies the requirements of the FAA’s savings clause in § 2, 
                                                     
53 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
54 Id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)); Justice Thomas has 
repeatedly stated his opposition to implied preemption, objecting to where “the Court routinely invalidates state laws 
based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of 
congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law,” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“[I am] increasing[ly] reluctan[t] to expand federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of 
implied pre-emption.”). 
55 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754-55 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
56 Id. at 1756. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. 
59 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
60 Id. 
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merely placing arbitration clauses on the same or equal footing as other contract clauses;61 and (2) 
the Discover Bank rule is consistent with the purpose behind the FAA because class arbitration is 
not opposed to the fundamental attributes of arbitration.62  Accordingly, the dissent argued that 
the ban on class waivers applied broadly enough to all contracts that it satisfied the savings clause 
and that class arbitration’s form was not fundamentally adverse to the purpose of the FAA.63 
The dissent premised its argument for qualification under the savings clause on the notion 
that the Discover Bank rule was nothing more than an “authoritative state-court interpretation” of 
that state’s general unconscionability law.64  California Civil Code already declared exculpatory 
contracts or clauses illegal, and authorized expansion of the unconscionability doctrine to such 
terms.65  Therefore, consumer adhesion contracts that effectively exculpated companies like 
AT&T through class waivers violated the pre-existing California unconscionability doctrine.  To 
the dissent, the Discover Bank rule did little more than determine that certain contracts that met 
the three-prong requirement were as exculpatory as other contracts that limited liability under 
California law.66  Indeed, not all class action waivers were unconscionable under California law, 
only ones which satisfied the qualities of an exculpatory contract or term.67  Breyer reasoned the 
that application of California’s unconscionability doctrine under these circumstances, whether in 
an arbitration agreement or an agreement subject to litigation, placed class waivers “upon the 
same footing as other contracts.”68 
In response to Scalia’s condemnation of class arbitration as a process fundamentally 
different from bilateral arbitration because of its form, the dissent urged that the FAA was not 
enacted to secure substantive rights to any particular procedural advantages.69  Rather, the FAA 
was passed so that arbitration, when freely chosen by the contracting parties as a venue for 
remedy, would be honored by the courts.70  To the dissent, class arbitration itself would not be 
adverse to the primary purpose or primary objective of the FAA unless it discouraged the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.71  Therefore the primary objective of the FAA was 
enforcement of arbitration clauses and not, as the majority indicated, protecting a particular form 
of arbitration that guaranteed low costs to parties or expedient claim resolution.72 
                                                     
61 Id. at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Because California applies the same 
legal principles to address the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers as it does to address the unconscionability 
of any other contractual provision, the merits of class proceedings should not factor into our decision.”); and id. at 1758 
(“[U]nlike the majority’s examples, the Discover Bank rule imposes equivalent limitations on litigation . . . .”). 
62 Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743 n.9) (“Where does the majority get its 
contrary idea--that individual, rather than class, arbitration is a ‘fundamental attribut[e]’ of arbitration?  The majority 
does not explain.  And it is unlikely to be able to trace its present view to the history of the arbitration statute itself.”).     
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1756. 
65 Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§1668, 1670.5(a) (West 1985)). 
66 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. (“Courts applying California law have enforced class action waivers where they satisfy general 
unconscionability standards.”) (emphasis added). 
68 Id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). 
69 Id. at 1758. 
70 Id. 
71 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“But we have also cautioned against thinking that 
Congress’ primary objective was to guarantee these particular procedural advantages.  Rather, that primary objective 
was to secure the ‘enforcement’ of agreements to arbitrate.”) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 470 U.S. at 221). 
72 Id.  
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To counter the litany of difficulties associated with class procedure as outlined by the 
majority, Breyer referenced several sources approving of class arbitration and declared the 
procedure “consistent with the use of arbitration.”73  Prominently, the dissent cited the American 
Arbitration Association’s (AAA) amicus brief from Stolt-Nielsen, which described class 
arbitration as “a fair, balanced, and efficient means of resolving class disputes.”74  The AAA also 
favorably described the benefits of class arbitration, stating that class arbitration reduced the 
average time for dispute resolution over court-based class actions.75  Therefore, even if the FAA 
was enacted for the specific purpose of expediting claims in a low-cost, efficient, and fair 
resolution process, class arbitration was not inconsistent with any of those attributes.76   
The dissent concluded by stating that the Court has previously considered the dynamic 
nature of arbitration proceedings and the varied forms they might take, demonstrating the illogic 
of the majority’s restriction of arbitration to a particular form.77  Absent a state law that 
“disfavors arbitration,” the dissent stated that California’s law was not preempted and that states 
should be able to apply their own doctrines of unconscionability consistent with that restriction.78 
II.  FAA PREEMPTION & ANALYSIS 
As the holding in Concepcion rests on the majority’s finding that the FAA preempts 
California law, it is vital to consider the source of the FAA’s preemption and the context in which 
state law is supplanted by the operation of the federal statute.  Since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating,79 the Court has interpreted § 2 of the FAA as preempting 
state laws that single out arbitration for disfavored treatment.80  As the Court has stated in the 
past, however, the FAA contains no express preemption provision.81  Therefore, a preemption 
finding is dependent upon an implication of Congress’s intent to displace state authority.  In 
Concepcion, the majority held that the Discover Bank rule was preempted “because it ‘stands as 
                                                     
73 Id. 
74 Id. (quoting Brief for American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae at 25, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198)). 
75 Id. at 1759 (quoting Brief for American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 
24, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 2896309); see also 
id. at 1759-60 (“Data from California courts confirm that class arbitrations can take considerably less time than in-court 
proceedings in which class certification is sought . . . And a single class proceeding is surely more efficient than 
thousands of separate proceedings for identical claims.  Thus, if speedy resolution were all that mattered, the Discover 
Bank rule would reinforce, not obstruct that objective of the Act.”).     
76 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The dissent specifically rejected the idea that the 
FAA’s “primary purpose” was to provide a simplified and expedient claim resolution process, citing Dean Witter: “we 
‘reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of 
claims.’”  Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 219.  
77 Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“We have reached results that authorize complex arbitration procedures . . . 
We have upheld nondiscriminatory state laws that slow down arbitration proceedings . . . But we have not, to my 
knowledge, applied the Act to strike down a state statute that treats arbitrations on par with judicial and administrative 
proceedings.”). 
78 Id. at 1760. 
79 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
80 Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 422 (2006). 
81 Volt Info. Scis., Inc., v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (“The FAA 
contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a general congressional intent to occupy the entire field of 
arbitration.”). 
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an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’”82  This section examines (1) the source of Congress’s preemption power, and (2) the 
doctrine of implied “obstacle” preemption and the problems associated with implied FAA 
preemption. 
A. The Source of Congress’s Power to Preempt 
It is widely agreed that the “pre-emption doctrine is derived” from the Supremacy 
Clause,83 and “any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which 
interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.”84  Further, to determine “whether the 
Congress ha[s] precluded state enforcement of select state laws adopted pursuant to its authority . 
. . [t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” 85  These two often quoted pillars of 
federal preemption doctrine continue to guide the Court’s reasoning in FAA cases dating back to 
Southland.86   
However, acceptance of these maxims is not universal and some legal theorists, including 
Professor Stephen Gardbaum and Professor Caleb Nelson, compellingly contend that federal 
preemption doctrine incorrectly locates the source of Congress’s preemption power in the 
Supremacy Clause.87  Their alternative view posits that the Supremacy Clause operates 
automatically to determine whether state law or federal law should govern where the two sources 
of power are contradictory.88  Preemption, on the other hand, occurs when Congress affirmatively 
deprives states of their authority to act, even where state law does not contradict the federal law at 
all.89  This view challenges the accepted doctrine of implied preemption that state law is 
displaced when it merely obstructs the purposes of Congress.90  As the Court in Concepcion 
expanded the interpretation of the FAA to preclude a particular form of arbitration, revisiting 
FAA preemption is warranted to comprehend to what extent state law is valid before it conflicts 
with the FAA’s “principal purpose.” 
Under Gardbaum and Nelson’s alternative approach, state law is naturally displaced, or 
“trumped,” under the Supremacy Clause by a federal statute “[w]hen a court must choose 
between applying a valid rule of federal law and applying some aspect of state law.”91  This 
distinction is important to the application of the doctrine of implied preemption because it 
categorizes “supremacy” as the effect which occurs when compliance with both laws as written is 
                                                     
82 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). 
83 U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. 
84 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt., 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)). 
85 Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (“Congress under the 
Commerce Clause may displace state power.”).  
86 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 1-2.  
87 See Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 39; Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000). 
88 Nelson, supra note 87, at 231. 
89 See Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 771.  
90 As stated, FAA preemption of state law can be traced to Southland, where the Court first held that the FAA 
preempts state laws that target arbitration agreements.  See Bales, supra note 80, at 422. 
91 Nelson, supra note 87, at 231. 
 
 
19 
impossible.92  If the Supremacy Clause does not provide Congress with an affirmative power, but 
instead acts as a “tiebreaker” for courts in determining which law should govern a particular 
matter, then the Supremacy Clause cannot be the source of power for implied preemption.93  
Because obstacle preemption is a particular variety of the implied preemption doctrine, 
determining whether supremacy or preemption is involved has specific importance to 
Concepcion. 
This does not mean, however, that preemption is unauthorized by the Constitution.  To 
the contrary, Professor Gardbaum describes preemption as a valid exercise of Congress’s power 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause94 to displace state authority.95  According to Gardbaum 
“the most compelling argument in favor of a congressional power of preemption is a practical one 
– the need for uniform national regulation, for one set of rules in particular areas.”96  The 
Necessary and Proper Clause enables Congress to effectuate its enumerated powers under the 
Constitution, and most frequently under the Commerce Clause.97  This is consistent with the 
Court’s statement of federal preemption in Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. 
Schermerhorn,98 although missing the step of the Necessary and Proper Clause’s operation, 
stating that “Congress under the Commerce Clause may displace state power.”99   
Yet, Gardbaum contends that Congress is limited to an extent in using its power to 
preempt.100  Because preemption involves the operation of one of Congress’s enumerated powers, 
incorporating the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is a discretionary power which 
may only be invoked expressly.101  Thus, it is predictable that Gardbaum concludes: “[a]s a 
matter of constitutional law, there should be no such thing as implied preemption.”102 
B. Implied Preemption 
The doctrine of implied preemption features most prominently in Concepcion in the 
majority’s consideration of the “principal purpose” of the FAA.103  Arriving at the conclusion that 
the FAA’s purpose is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to 
                                                     
92 See Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 41.  Though Professor Nelson does not draw the same taxonomical distinction 
between preemption and supremacy as Gardbaum, he nonetheless outlines his “logical-contradiction” test (which is 
compatible with Gardbaum’s views) for determining whether a state law is trumped by the Supremacy Clause: “Courts 
are required to disregard state law if, but only if, it contradicts a rule validly established by federal law.”  Nelson, supra 
note 87, at 260. 
93 Implied preemption will be discussed infra, but is generally described as occurring when a state law “stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Hines, 312 U.S. at 
67.  
94 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
95 See Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 781.   
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 782. 
98 Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963). 
99 Id. at 103. 
100 Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 51-59. 
101 Id. at 51 (“Preemption is one of Congress’s enumerated powers albeit, as I have argued, a part of its 
enumerated implied powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  As an inherent feature of federal law, supremacy 
operates whether Congress says so or not.  By contrast, as a discretionary power of Congress, preemption operates only 
if Congress says so.”) 
102 Id. at 52. 
103 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748-53. 
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their terms,”104 Scalia next states that “[t]he point of affording parties discretion in designing 
arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of 
dispute.”105  The majority opinion then adopts the view that arbitration, as Congress intended 
when it enacted the FAA, required certain procedural and functional qualities with which class 
arbitration would be inconsistent.106  This purpose was inferred by the Court, and consistent with 
its prior holding in Stolt-Nielsen.107  Because Congress had not stated its intent to preempt state 
law, both the primary purpose of the FAA and Congress’s intent to preempt state authority were 
implied.  By restricting the form that arbitration may take outside of the specific intent of the 
contracting parties, the Court expanded the preemptive power to exclude more state law than 
previously considered. 
Many critics of FAA preemption point to the Court’s decision in Southland as the crucial 
moment where the FAA’s § 2 was first considered preemptive “substantive law,” rather than 
procedural law that did not bind state courts.108  In Southland, the majority concluded that ‘[i]n 
enacting [Section] 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration 
and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which 
the contracting parties had agreed to resolve by arbitration.”109  Justice O’Connor notably 
dissented in that case and argued that the FAA declared federal procedural law, which applied 
only in federal courts, not state courts.110  This view has been echoed most recently by Justice 
Thomas who continues to argue that the FAA applies only in federal courts.111 
This conflicting interpretive view of the FAA’s purpose is the critical juncture where the 
alternative view mentioned in the previous section might be instructive.  Southland must be based 
upon implied preemption because the FAA “contains no express pre-emption provision.”112  
There is no indication that the FAA is necessarily incompatible with state arbitration laws, at least 
to the extent that the state laws do not ban arbitration clauses outright.  Supremacy, under 
Gardbaum’s alternative view, therefore is not at issue.113  Determining whether the FAA trumps 
state law under the Supremacy Clause is a matter of statutory construction, similar to the 
                                                     
104 Id. at 1748. 
105 Id. at 1749. 
106 See id. at 1748. 
107 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773 (2010). 
108 See generally David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over State Courts, 
83 OR. L. REV. 541, 544 (2004) (stating that “[t]he constitutional problem of applying the FAA to the states has been 
avoided or overlooked, simply by taking at face value the Southland Court’s assertion that the FAA is ‘substantive’ 
law.  But what if it is not?”); Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 394 n.3 
(2004) (“Despite the passage of time and the Supreme Court’s reaffirmance of Southland in Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 
272-73, Southland’s holding that the FAA applies in state court remains controversial.”). 
109 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10. 
110Id. at 22-23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s decision is impelled by an understandable desire to 
encourage the use of arbitration, but it utterly fails to recognize the clear congressional intent underlying the FAA. 
Congress intended to require federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements.”). 
111 See e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285-86 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“In Southland Corp. v. Keating, this Court concluded that [section] 2 of the FAA ‘appl[ies] in state as well as federal 
courts,’ and ‘withdr[aws] the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the 
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.’  In my view, both aspects of Southland are wrong.” (citations 
omitted)). 
112 Volt, 489 U.S. at 477. 
113 See Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 770.  (“The supremacy of federal law means that valid federal law overrides 
otherwise valid state law in cases of conflict between the two.”). 
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procedure required for evaluating “whether one statute repeals another.”114  Because the 
alternative view eliminates the doctrine of implied preemption, O’Connor’s view that the FAA 
applies only in federal courts is vindicated. 
Although this discussion may seem trivial considering the Court’s devotion to the present 
“categorical” approach to preemption115 and wide adoption of the doctrine of implied 
preemption,116 the distinction between preemption and supremacy is helpful for halting an 
expansive doctrine of preemption evidenced in Concepcion.  As FAA obstacle preemption is 
based on a state law’s conflict with Congress’s purposes, an ever-narrowing construction of the 
kind of procedures the Court infers to be permitted under the FAA necessarily expands the FAA’s 
preemptive effect.  For instance, prior to Stolt-Nielsen (and to a certain extent Green Tree Fin. 
Corp. v. Bazzle117) the Court had not held that class arbitration was inconsistent with the concept 
of arbitration advanced in the FAA.  To the extent that the Court had not yet considered whether 
the availability of class arbitration was inconsistent with the FAA, California’s state law was, at 
that point, not preempted.   
This of course highlights the fundamental problem with implied preemption: it is subject 
to change depending upon the interpretation of Congress’s “purpose” by the Court’s majority.  As 
Justice O’Connor stated in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: “over the past decade, the 
Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal 
Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”118  In the 59 years 
prior to Southland, the Supreme Court had never held that the FAA even applied in state 
courts.119   A more predictable standard of preemption advocated by the alternative view above, 
where Congress’s intent to displace state authority must be expressly stated, provides greater 
clarity for delineating the balance between state and federal law.120   
                                                     
114 Nelson, supra note 87, at 303. 
115 The “categorical” approach I refer to here is the practice of complicating what is argued above to be an 
enumerated power of Congress to preempt by creating different categories of preemption that each make different 
inferences about the nature of Congress’s intent (e.g. “field,” “conflict,” “obstacle,” “express,” and “purpose-conflict”).  
See Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 61-62. 
116 Even Justice O’Connor later stated her belief that her dissent is Southland had failed to correct the 
fundamental problems with the Court’s interpretation of the FAA.  In Allied-Bruce, she stated her resignation: “I have 
long adhered to the view, discussed below, that Congress designed the Federal Arbitration Act to apply only in federal 
courts.  But if we are to apply the Act in state courts, it makes little sense to read § 2 differently in that context.  In the 
end, my agreement with the Court’s construction of § 2 rests largely on the wisdom of maintaining a uniform 
standard.”  513 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
117 Green Tree Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).  In Green Tree, the Court considered whether a state court 
could order class-wide arbitration.  The South Carolina Supreme Court had found that the arbitration agreement at issue 
was silent on the issue of class-wide arbitration, and on this basis had ordered such arbitration to resolve similar 
disputes of additional parties.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the arbitrator, rather than the state court should have 
decided whether the arbitration agreement permitted class-wide arbitration.  Bales, supra note 80, at 424. 
118 Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
119 See id. at 286 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the FAA’s application in state courts was not even 
suggested by a court until 1959). 
120 Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 52 (“Congress can only exercise its preemption power expressly.  As a matter of 
constitutional law, there should be no such thing as implied preemption.  If Congress wishes to exercise its preemption 
power, it must say so by speaking directly to the issue.  It is up to the courts to determine what Congress has said, using 
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation in the case of ambiguity, but not to premise an exercise of this power on 
“sheer implication” from congressional silence, as is now the case”) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 
504, 546 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
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III.  WHAT CONCEPCION MEANS FOR THE CLASS-ACTION 
Although the alternative view proposed in Section II would greatly improve clarity of 
judicial preemption doctrine, the Court’s adherence to the current “categorical” approach 
combined with the resignation of previous dissenters to stare decisis121 makes it unlikely that any 
real change is on the horizon.  However, substantial questions remain regarding the effect the 
majority opinion in Concepcion will have on class actions and consumer agreements.  Several 
commentators have suggested that Concepcion sounded the death knell of class actions.122  This 
section considers the various concerns raised by those commentators. 
In 2000, Professor Jean Sternlight wrote an article in the William & Mary Law Review 
that prophesied the coming of Concepcion.123  She noted that companies would use arbitration 
clauses as vehicles to immunize themselves from class action lawsuits.124  She referred to an 
arbitration clause packaged with a class waiver as a “Trojan horse.”125  Additionally, Professor 
Sternlight observed that companies would issue mandatory class waiver provisions after the filing 
of class actions and would be successful.126  The similarities between her predicted worst case 
scenario for consumers and the actual case of Concepcion is striking, as nearly all came to pass.  
Sternlight, however, was incorrectly optimistic that courts would come around to reject class 
waivers from arbitration clauses as unconscionable under state law.127 
Professor Brian Fitzpatrick believes that Concepcion will likely lead to the end of class 
actions against businesses altogether, not just consumer class actions.128  He predicates this theory 
on the Supreme Court’s decisions limiting the certification of tort class actions beginning in the 
1990s.129  In his opinion, potential class litigants now come primarily from individuals involved 
in a contractual business relationship, and where businesses have been given the green light to 
immunize themselves through class waivers in adhesion contracts, the result will greatly reduce 
the availability of class proceedings.130  Correctly, Fitzpatrick points to the remaining solution to 
                                                     
121 I refer here primarily to Justice O’Connor’s position in Allied-Bruce, discussed supra note 116. 
122 See e.g., Jean Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action 
Survive? 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (2000); Hiro Aragaki, Status and contract in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 14, 2011, 3:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/status-and-contract-in-att-mobility-v-
concepcion; Cliff Palefsky, Closing thoughts on the arbitration symposium, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 26, 2011, 6:41 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/closing-thoughts-on-the-arbitration-symposium; Brian Fitzpatrick, Is the end of 
the class actions upon us? SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 14, 2011, 9:35 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/is-the-end-
of-class-actions-upon-us; David Scwartz, Do-it-yourself tort reform: How the Supreme Court quietly killed the class 
action, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 16, 2011, 10:52 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/do-it-yourself-tort-reform-
how-the-supreme-court-quietly-killed-the-class-action.  
123 See Sternlight, supra note 122, at 5. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 125. 
126 Id. at 11. 
127 Id. at 126.  Although Professor Sternlight could be correctly credited with predicting the district court and 
Ninth Circuit decisions in Concepcion, the result at the Supreme Court precludes the likelihood that courts will, in the 
future, enforce state law bans on class waivers (“This author predicts that, as courts begin to reject defendants’ attempts 
to eliminate class actions altogether, it will become evident that the hybrid of classwide arbitration has few advocates.   
Rather, defendants, plaintiffs, and society as a whole, likely will adopt the securities industry’s conclusion that class 
actions are most efficiently and justly handled through litigation.”). 
128 Fitzpatrick, supra note 122. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
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the plight of the class action: federal intervention.131  As the Court in Concepcion further limited 
the extent to which state law might survive obstacle preemption, only a contrary federal law or 
amendment to the FAA can return FAA jurisprudence to its rightful, presumably pre-Southland, 
place. 
Professor David Schwartz agrees with Professor Sternlight, stating that “it has been an 
open secret for over a decade that a major motivation, perhaps the dominant motivation for the 
imposition of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts has been the hope that these clauses would 
blossom into class action waivers.”132  Further, he argues that the Supreme Court has permitted, 
even manipulated, the FAA to become a functional, “do-it-yourself tort reform.”133  Arbitration 
agreements therefore have become supercontracts134 that defy the Court’s ruling in Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.,135 that the FAA “make[s] arbitration agreements as enforceable 
as other contracts, but not more so.”136 
These commentators all recite a similar litany: that the Concepcion Court, by expanding 
the preemption doctrine to preclude state policies against exculpatory agreements through class 
waivers in adhesion contracts, authorized the death of the class action.  Of course, the extent to 
which this statement is true depends upon several factors, such as whether Congress chooses to 
enact arbitration reform legislation, whether the membership of the Court changes to weigh in 
favor of those justices who dissented in Concepcion, and whether businesses themselves 
recognize the utility of class action litigation.  Only time will tell, but for the short term it seems 
that the Court has certainly foreclosed most of the conceivable challenges states might bring 
against FAA preemption. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Concepcion expanded its application of obstacle preemption to 
preclude states from enforcing public policies against unconscionable adhesion contracts.137  In 
doing so, it carried on the logical conclusion from its holding in Stolt-Nielsen, that class 
arbitration is fundamentally opposed to the purposes of bilateral arbitration and the FAA.138  
However, even if the FAA’s “principal purpose” as described by Scalia, “is to ‘ensur[e] that 
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms,’”139 the FAA cannot be taken 
to mean that private agreements to arbitrate should be enforced in spite of their unconscionable 
terms.  Surely the FAA stands for a fundamental agreement to contract, based on the consent and 
intent of both contracting parties.140  Presuming this to be true, it is even more difficult to believe 
that the Court can find the freedom of contract embodied in agreements where the parties cannot 
                                                     
131 Id. 
132 Schwartz, supra note 108. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
136 Id. at 404 n.12 (emphasis added). 
137 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
138 See generally Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1758. 
139 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
140 See Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government’s Role in Punishment 
and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 555 (1994) (“Application of the contract-enforcing 
rule of Section 2 [of the FAA] to choice-of-law clauses is entirely consistent with the freedom of contract core of the 
FAA.”). 
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be shown to have entered freely.141  “[I]t would be an odd conception of contractual liberty if a 
law were taken to restrict freedom of contract simply because it interfered with the parties’ 
agreement as written.”142 
Despite concern over the practical effects of Concepcion and the very real threat to the 
availability of class actions, the primary issue focused on in this article is the Court’s decision to 
permit an expansive interpretation of the purposes of Congress in enacting particular legislation.  
Obstacle preemption should be abandoned by the Court as a doctrine and substituted with the 
simplified approach to preemption proposed by Professor Gardbaum.143  Doing so will certainly 
place a greater onus on Congress to be clear in asserting its power to displace state power, but this 
is not inconsistent with the Court’s previous holdings on Congress’s abrogation of sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 
Additionally, the Court’s view that arbitration under the FAA is restricted to a particular 
form is not only absent from the text of the FAA, it is reminiscent of the prejudices and attitudes 
towards arbitration that precipitated its enactment.  The Court’s “essentialism,” as termed by 
Professor Hiro Aragaki, is outmoded considering the modern capabilities and experience of 
arbitrators to handle aggregated claims.144  Additionally, the Court’s conclusion that banning 
class waiver provisions will disfavor arbitration because parties will be less inclined to enter into 
arbitration agreements merely guarantees that the “most loyal patrons” are favored over the 
“institution of arbitration.”145 
As Justice O’Connor stated in her Allied-Bruce concurrence, the “edifice” of the Court’s 
FAA preemption caselaw has been largely of its own construction.146  The fear is that this 
construction has become too impenetrable and that there is no way back through the woods in 
which the Court has led us.  The Court’s holding in Concepcion stands as a bleak indication that a 
state policy interest in protecting unsophisticated parties with little or no real bargaining power is 
an interest the Court believes is subservient to the rigid religion of the FAA. 
                                                     
141 See Palefsky, supra note 122 (“But the real vice of the Court’s decision is not how they have contorted 
contract law and the FAA to reach their desired result, but rather that they have refused to analyze the issues under the 
Constitution or real statutory public policies which sit higher on the continuum of legal analysis and require the waiver 
or rights inherent in an arbitration agreement to be knowing and voluntary.  And there shouldn’t be a freedom of 
contract analysis when the contract was not entered into freely.”). 
142 Aragaki, supra note 122. 
143 Gardbaum, supra note 5, at 59-64. 
144 See Aragaki, supra note 122. 
145 Id. 
146 See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
